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Structured Abstract 
Purpose: This paper seeks to chronicle the roots of corporate governance form its 
narrow shareholder perspective to the current bourgeoning stakeholder approach 
while giving cognizance to institutional investors and their effective role in ESG in 
light of the King Report III of South Africa.  It is aimed at a critical review of the 
extant literature from the shareholder Cadbury epoch to the present day King Report 
novelty. We aim to: (i) offer an analytical state of corporate governance in the Anglo-
Saxon world, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Far East Asia and Africa; and 
(ii) illuminate the lead role the king Report of South Africa is playing as the 
bellwether of the stakeholder approach to corporate governance as well as guiding the 
role of institutional investors in ESG. 
 
Methodology/Approach: We steered a library-based research by critically analyzing 
the extant literature on corporate governance with the King Report (III) and other 
international corporate governance codes as an analytical tool in order to draw our 
conclusions. 
 
Findings and Implications:  
We found that, cultural, geographical differences as well as international contacts play 
a vital role in shaping the diverse systems of corporate governance across the globe. It 
is most apparent that on the regional segmented clusters of corporate governance as 
enumerated in the paper; traditional indigenous cultures, colonialism and the 
emerging economies’ long relation with the Bretton woods institutions offered the 
architectural framework from which corporate governance evolved from within these 
countries, not loosing sight of the significant role the King Report offers the globe as 
regards holistic governance and the effective role of institutional investor in 
Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) Issues in the promotion of responsible 
investments. We conclude with a call for the need to speed the adoption of the 
stakeholder approach to corporate governance, as this would serve as a conduit to 
championing stakeholder accountability and transparency and aid offer a strong 
backing to institutional investors in policing corporations within both the corporate 
and mainstream world as regards ESG. 
 
Originality: Much as there is the obvious existence of a plethora of research within 
the corporate governance arena as well as the role of institutional investors in ESG, 
expect for a recent paper to the best of the researchers knowledge by (Solomon and 
Maroun, 2012 ,2013 forthcoming) that looked at integrated reporting from the 
perspective of King Report III, there have been no attempt at profiling corporate 
governance from it historic roots while shredding light on the trial blazed by the king  
report III in relation to holistic governance/the stakeholder view and the effective role 
of institutional investors in ESG. 
 
Further Research: This current research makes clear the need for further research 
with in-depth interviews as a conduit to ascertaining the awareness and practice of the 
Institutional investor community in South African-in their response to the noble calls 
of the King Reporting III and their role in ESG. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Cadbury Report, King Report; Anglo-Saxon; 
MENA; Far East Asia; Africa; Stakeholders; Holistic Governance; Institutional 
Investors; ESG; Responsible Investments 
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1.0 Introduction 
As investments and capital sourcing remain an integral part of the 
business world, so is the demand and guarantee of ones 
investments (Mallin, 2010). This has over the years reflected in the 
demands by shareholders and other stakeholders for access to vital 
information regarding their investments, returns and other interest 
(environmental, responsibility, responsiveness, transparency and 
accountability) as well as dividends.  
This therefore means that, there exist a relationship between two or 
more persons where one ought to be accountable to the other 
resulting in what Jensen and Meckling (1976) termed  the agency 
relationship. In this relationship, there exist a principal and an 
agent where the principal entrust upon the agent some 
responsibilities to perform on behalf of the principal. In the 
discharge of the responsibilities by the agent several issues may 
arise which could be detrimental to the principal as the principal 
possesses limited expertise with regards the responsibilities 
assigned to the agent resulting in what is known as an agency 
problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A clear test of these 
problems resulted in some corporate scandal as the Enron, Barings, 
and Parmalat (Solomon, 2011; Mallin, 2010).  
 
Owing to the agency problem and other issues of transparency, 
information asymmetries and accountability, and for the fact that 
businesses are pivotal to the growth and development of 
economies, the government of the United Kingdom produced the 
Cadbury Report. This report turned out to be the governing 
‘constitution’ of their corporate sector; it trailed the blaze for 
several corporate governance codes to be developed. Mention can 
be made of the King Report of South Africa, the OECD Principles of 
Corporate governance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 among others that 
followed after the Cadbury Report. However, one limitation of most 
of these corporate governance codes and principles is that they are 
designed for listed companies and central to shareholders whiles 
placing stakeholders on the periphery. The resultant effect of this is 
that pertinent activities of companies on material social, 
environmental, ethical and governance issues, which have a direct 
effective on stakeholders, are as well neglected. Pursing the 
stakeholder concern and ensuring responsible investment is best 
driven by a community of investors within the stakeholder fold of 
society known as institutional investors. Despite their existence and 
potential for championing the progression of stakeholders for who 
they represent in fiduciary capacities, most corporate governance 
codes with the exception of the king Report III of South Africa have 
fail to ascribe to them their full recognition and a fecund space to 
operate.   
 
In this paper therefore, attention is given to a review of literature 
pertaining to the global evolution of corporate governance focusing 
on stakeholder accountability and transparency. As well as 
concluding on the lead role the king report III of South Africa is 
currently playing in incorporating holistic governance into the 
broader rubric of corporate governance. Results from the research 
reveal the vital role cultural difference, colonialism, 
internationalization and the long standing relation between the 
developing world and the Bretton Woods institutions and how far 
that has gone in erecting the corporate governance architectural 
frame work of the developing world. It further exudes the 
prominence the King Report III of South Africa has offered 
institutional investors in carrying high and bright the torch of Social, 
Environmental and ethical issues leading up to responsible 
investment. Observations are that: expect for the West, there is 
less presence of effective institutional investor presence and their 
role in promoting social, environmental and governance issues 
within the developing world.  
 
The research therefore sets off on a literature journey in 
establishing the emergence of the stakeholder and institutional 
investor role as espoused by the King Reporting III while calling for 
further research among the institutional investor community in 
South Africa through the conduct of in-depth interviews so as to 
ascertain the actual potency and positive activism in the fight 
towards ESG, hence responsible investments.  
 
The paper is segment into four parts with the first constituting the 
introduction as enumerated above. A full-bodied definition 
accompanied by an evolutionary trace of corporate governance 
whiles shedding light on the stakeholder value is traced from the 
Anglo-Saxon world, through the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) to Far East Asia and Africa in section two. Section three 
offers an in-depth analysis of the King Report IIIs’ role in offering 
institutional investors the room to promote ESG. Conclusion and the 
call for further research ends the paper in section four.   
  
2.2 What is Corporate Governance?   
2.2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
The term corporate governance has over time been attributed to 
different interpretations and definitions. Though considered within 
its jurisdiction of operation, some attempts are been made at 
defining corporate governance. According to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), corporate governance involves how suppliers of finance 
guarantee themselves of earning their commensurate investments. 
This definition however falls short of the aspect of control of the 
firm as well as stakeholder inclusion. The Cadbury Report (1992, 
p.14) simply defines corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”.  Inferring from this 
definition, it is evident that its focus revolves around the 
responsibilities of boards of directors, which is usually termed as 
internal control.  
 
Of the numerous definitions of corporate governance, the King 
Report (2002) and Solomon (2011)   appears to have embraced the 
stakeholder approach in their definitions of the discipline. Paragraph 
(4) of the King Report (2002) espouses the stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance as follows: 
 Unlike [other corporate governance reports] the King Report 
…went beyond the financial and regulatory aspects of 
corporate governance in advocating an integrated approach to 
good governance in the interests of a wide range of 
stakeholders having regard to the fundamental principles of 
good financial, social, ethical and environmental practice… 
(King Report, 2002 p.7, para.4). 
Another but extensive and stakeholder inclusive definition of 
corporate governance comes from Solomon. In her book; Corporate 
Governance and Accountability, Solomon (2011, p.6) defined 
corporate governance as “the system of check and balances, both 
internal and external to companies, which ensure that companies 
discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a 
socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity”. This 
definition reflects almost all the strands of corporate governance 
but less emphatic on transparency, as companies could be 
accountable but opaque (less transparent). Notwithstanding this, for 
the purpose of this research, corporate governance is viewed from 
the definitive perspective of the King Report (2002;2009) and that 
of Solomon (2010) with an incorporation of transparency.   
 
  
 2.2.2 The Global Evolution of Corporate Governance 
Many researchers and the business community has since the 80’s 
held the perception that most organizations and corporate setups 
have over the years discarded their responsibility to stakeholders 
(Fischel, 1982). In their bid to cure this corporate problem which 
Fischel (1982) considers “perceived”, several corporate governance 
codes and principles emerged with the Cadbury report (1992) 
perhaps as the foremost. If Fischel, perchance foresaw the Enron, 
Parmalat, the Royal Bank of Scotland and some extractive sector 
debacles like the BP Gulf of Mexico incident (Macondo), the recent 
South African Mine riots, the recent financial crisis (2008), he would 
probably  have had a change of view with respect to the existing  
problems of corporate governance. 
 
As described by Brennan and Solomon (2008), corporate 
governance is an eclectic concept with different elements and 
perceptions imbued with jurisdictional operational essentials. This 
therefore makes it different in diverse ways, hence multifaceted in 
nature. Also, an incorporation of the stakeholder as an integral part 
of corporate governance has succeeded in the evolution of 
corporate governance from a concept to a discipline (Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008). The UK Tyson Report (2003) for instance is 
reflective of a stakeholder dimension to corporate governance as it 
calls for the widening of the corporate boards’ net to include people 
from different shades of life and interest. Moving forward, the 
stakeholder perspective of corporate governance appears to have 
gained momentum with proposals from the south African King 
Report (2002; 2009)   which promotes a more inclusive approach as 
regard stakeholders (Brennan and Solomon, 2008).  Despite this, 
(MCwilliams and Siegel, 2001; Jensen, 2001) are of the opinion that 
the stakeholder approach of a corporation furnishes managers and 
interest groups an opportunity to further their own interest (i.e. 
social, environmental and ethical issues) which appeals and 
resonates with them at the expense of the stakeholder.    
Jensen (2001,p.9) further solidifies this argument by expositing that 
“the stakeholder theory directs managers to serve ‘many masters’, 
he as well inferred from an old adage that ‘“when there are many 
masters, all end up being short-changed”’. However, interestingly, 
there are several evidence including that of Jensen that points to 
the fact that imbedding the stakeholder as an integral part of a firm 
is an inevitable role that every business seeking growth, survival 
and legitimacy must embrace (Archel et al., 2011; Jensen, 2001; 
MCwilliams and Siegel, 2001; Cadbury, 2000a). The stakeholder 
concept is therefore emerging as a common feature in all the 
different systems of corporate governance. 
 
2.2.3 Systems of Corporate Governance   
2.2.3.1 Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance 
Within the Anglo-Saxon setting, a cocktail of events sparked the 
tiding waves of corporate governance. The Information technology 
bubble (Chen and Chen, 2012), the Arthur Anderson, the 
WorldCom, and the Enron epics amongst others could be counted as 
some corporate scandals which fuelled Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance. As these are recent cases, we are in no way suggesting 
that corporate governance commenced in the height of these 
incidences. In fact, works of (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), points to substantial 
empirical evidence of corporate governance in the Anglo-Saxon 
world long before the emergence of modern day corporate scandals, 
of which are cited by many academics and industrial professionals 
as “the straw that broke the camels back” as well as the matchstick 
that lit the proliferation of corporate governance, especially within 
the Anglo-Saxon setting (Charreaux and Desbrières, 2001; Jennings 
and Marques, 2011; Weimer and Pape, 2002; Mallin et al., 2005). 
The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US) 
are considered as the lead countries with respect to Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance. Canada and Australia as well fall within this 
league. However, despite these countries being classified as such, it 
appears quite difficult to apply regionalism within the corporate 
governance realm due to international trade, mergers [and 
acquisition] (Cernat, 2004) as well as diversity (Berglöf and 
Thadden, 1999). This notwithstanding, Cernat (2004) is of the 
opinion that  financial market liberalization could lead to some 
segmented integration of corporate governance (i.e. toward the 
Anglo-Saxon system). 
Throughout the world of commerce, the Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate governance has been viewed as much inclined towards 
listed companies, but as succinctly put by Cadbury (2000b,p.2) “ 
the state-owned and private companies of today are the public 
companies of tomorrow and they, therefore, need to take note of 
governance trends”. This notion as proposed by Cadbury continues 
to seed the existence and yet to be corporate governance codes 
within the Anglo-Saxon circles. In terms of codes within this 
system, mentioned can be made of the UK Cadbury Report (1992), 
the Canadian Dey Report (1994), the UK Greenbury Report (1995), 
the UK Hampel Report (1998), the UK Turnbull Report (1999), the 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the UK Combined Code (2003, 
2006), the Australian Principle of Good Corporate Governance and 
Best Practices Recommendation (ASX 2003, 2007), not to mention 
but a few. 
 
Although viewed from the same lens, the above differences with 
respect to the nomenclature attributed to these codes is reflective 
of the fact that there exist some form of differences in relation to 
their evolutionary processes, forms and operability. There is also 
the existence of jurisdictional differences, for instance, the UK, the 
Australian and Canadian systems all adhere to the principle of 
‘comply or explain’ (Yang, 2011; Christensen et al., 2010) whereas 
the US adopts strict and to an extent some draconian measures1 
(Mullineux, 2010).  
Mullineux (2010,p.2) explicitly put this as “… the UK [favoring] ex 
ante scrutiny… whereas ex post litigation is [favored in the US]”. As 
well, it is interesting to note that, the Anglo-Saxon system of 
corporate governance is more akin, appreciative and protective to 
the shareholder than the stakeholder (Charreaux and Desbrières, 
2001; Schillig, 2010). This practice however seems different in 
recent times as Institutional Investors have become dominant 
within the Anglo-Saxon setting (Mallin et al., 2005), but Lehmann 
and Weigand (2000) sights this as deceptive because ownership 
concentration could be a deceitful and inadequate indicator of 
exerting control of affairs. They are however of the opinion that if 
financial institutions constitute a greater percentage of the 
ownership structure of a firm then a more positive impact could 
yield, as financial institution are considered efficient monitors.  
 
However, although Institutional Investors could be considered to 
some extent as stakeholders, this opinion seems not to appeal to: 
                                                        
1 Section 802 on Criminal Penalties for Altering Documentations of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 
for instance states: ‘‘§ 1519. Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal 
investigations and bankruptcy; ‘‘Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, 
covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the 
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter 
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States 
or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall 
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both (see The Sarbanes Oxley Act 
2002).  
(Weimer and Pape, 1999; Weimer and Pape, 2002; Schmidt and 
Spindler, 2002) as they place the two-tier board Germanic or 
Continental or Rhineland corporate governance superior (Weimer 
and Pape, 1999) over the one-tier Anglo-Saxon model (Mallin et al., 
2005). This is informed by existence of the supervisory board 
(within the Germanic system) which is lacking in the Anglo-Saxon 
model of corporate governance; nonetheless, it could be argued 
that the presence of the executive, non-executive, appointments 
and remuneration committees can all together compliment an 
efficient supervisory role hence achieving what many believe is 
missing within Anglo-Saxon corporate governance. Moreover, recent 
legislation in the US and UK somewhat strengthens public oversight, 
with the corporate systems borrowing lessons from the collapse of 
Enron and Arthur Anderson (Mullineux, 2010).  
Additionally, the whistleblowing legislation introduced and practiced 
in countries like Australia (Pascoe, 2010) do have the potential of 
salvaging to an extent some corporate collapses or failures within 
this system.  
 
As opined by Cadbury (2000b), there is no single right model of 
corporate governance, it therefore needs to be nurtured and 
developed overtime within a particular system. This thus calls for an 
exploration of other models of corporate governance.       
 
2.2.3.2 Corporate Governance in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) 
English written research and publication are quiet low on corporate 
governance in the MENA (Brierley and Gwilliam, 2002). 
Notwithstanding this, a blend of Islamic laws (i.e. Islamic Sharia) 
(Ali, 1990) and conventional banking principles present an 
interesting scenario of corporate governance within this arena 
where a good number of constituting countries are Muslim states. In 
MENA, the cultures of the people are predominately Arabian, so 
they turn to mimic the cultures of the Gulf which are closely knit 
economically, politically and Socially (Chahine, 2007). Not until 
after the 1980’s it was unclear as to how to characterize the 
financial market within MENA to the pervasiveness of less 
regulations (Sourial, 2004). Sourial (2004), Categorized and 
describe the MENA in three distinct economic strands as follows; 
firstly Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia which due to economic 
reforms opened up their economies for privatization, followed by 
the Gulf where oil revenues acts as an economic stabilizer and lastly 
countries like Lebanon, Libya, Algeria, Yemen and Sudan where 
political instability is stagnating growth. 
Coupled with these is the poor ownership structure and control of 
firms within MENA, especially in Tunisia (Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007), 
Egypt (Elsayed, 2007) and almost all countries within the MENA 
region (Sourial, 2004), firm ownership and control is by strong 
block holders who are usually family heads or elders. This trend is 
highly inimical to corporate practices because it is susceptibility to 
insider trading hence a consequential effect on a firms’ 
performance. Likewise, less privatization, close political system and 
poor regulations are major features within the financial market in 
the MENA (Chahine and Tohmé, 2009; Ben Naceur et al., 2007). 
However, the buoyant nature of the Gulf States gives indication to 
the direction that they will through oil trade conceal the realities for 
a period but with devastating corporate consequences following in 
the future. It is however, refreshing to note that some states are 
given indications of transparency and the advancement of some 
codes of governance. Once there is a great and continuous call for 
reforms and institutional development, one is tempted to say there 
is some light at the end of the tunnel.   
 
 
2.2.3.3 Corporate Governance in the Far East Asia 
A distinguishing feature of the Far East Asian corporate market is 
that the giants within this environment are either transiting or have 
transited from a communist to a free market economy, China and 
Russia are countries that readily come to mind (McCarthy and 
Puffer, 2002; Tam, 2002) within this region. Economic failures by 
most countries within the Far East led to the growth of corporate 
governance in this region (Tam, 2002; Tran Ngoc Huy and Tran 
Ngoc Hien, 2012). The aftermath of the Asian and recent global 
financial crisis of 2008 are also being counted as having contributed 
to this growth (Dinh Tran Ngoc, 2012).  
Elsewhere within this region, Russia is viewed as one of the 
economies that has embrace corporate governance in order to 
create a conducive market for foreign investments (McCarthy and 
Puffer, 2002). In a research paper to ascertain the style of 
corporate governance in Russia, McCarthy and Puffer (2002) cites 
Vimpelcom as the first Russian company to have enlisted on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) due to its embrace of good 
corporate governance principles. They further indicated how Yuko 
oil has increased its value through the practice of positive corporate 
principles in their quest to also enlist on NYSE. All of these they 
believe are influenced by International corporate standards, hence 
the conclusion that Russia’s significant strides in achieving robust 
corporate governance is influenced by the industrialized world.  
 
Albeit improvement in corporate practice within Russia, the prolong 
decades of communism and the practice of resorting to one’s 
‘contacts’ in government or higher positions to get things done 
present a challenge to the holistic achievement of formidable 
corporate practices (Puffer and McCarthy, 2003). This situation 
stands aggravated coupled with the fact that insiders dominate the 
private sector in Russia, also, the system is fraught with weak 
procedures, standards as well as low levels of transparency (Estrin 
and Wright, 1999). In effect, the Russian system could be one that 
will produce a corporate governance model reflecting the country’s 
practices and culture(McCarthy and Puffer, 2002). 
 
Notwithstanding the Asian crisis of 1997-1999 (Tran Ngoc Huy and 
Tran Ngoc Hien, 2012), the dominance of family control within Asian 
firms (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and the high presence of the state 
in the Chinese economy (Tam, 2002), China is still held in high 
stead within the global economic hierarchy. Witt and Redding 
(2012,p.4), beautifully describes Chinese economy as: 
“By any measure, China has re-emerged as a major player in 
the world economy. By the latest reckoning, it now has the 
world’s second-largest GDP, whether measured at nominal or 
purchasing-power parity exchange rates; produces the world’s 
largest trade surplus; holds the world’s largest foreign-
currency reserves; attracts less foreign investment only than 
the United States; and is now the world’s largest market for a 
range of products, including automobiles”. 
 
With this current growing economic state of China described above, 
it is, however, interesting to note that the Chinese are still grappling 
with challenges like culture and the influence of the State through 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the day to day running of 
government, quasi-government and private firms. Not too distant in 
the past and even till the year 2000, listing of firms were not 
determined by compliance criteria but by political merit, in fact 
Chinese corporate bosses viewed cooperate governance as a 
modern style of management (Tam, 2002) than a necessary 
component of their corporate activities. Tam (2002) Irrefutably, 
attributes this, to the cultural translation of the discipline corporate 
governance-the term “Fa ren zhi li jie gou” (the literally Chinese 
translation of corporate governance) portrayed more of a 
supervisory and administrative role than a corporate discipline that 
is to be incorporated into a firm and its operations. Evidence of the 
effect of the state control of the Chinese economy is illuminated by 
Lin et al. (2009,p.1) who in an academic paper seeking to 
determine governance and firm efficiency from a sample of 461 
manufacturing public listed Chinese companies within the period 
1999 and 2000 concludes that “the firm’s efficiency is negatively 
related to state ownership while positively related to public and 
employee share ownership”. 
 
A common trait of family domination within firms runs across all 
countries in the Far East with less of it in Japan but highly 
concentrated in Indonesia and Thailand and also with a 
representation of heavy presence of the state in Singapore, Korea, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia (Claessens et al., 2000). Such 
characteristics mimic less disclosures and transparency within public 
corporation in East Asia (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
 
In the Case of Japan, much foreign influence has been felt over the 
years and has played a significant role in their corporate structure 
and activities.  The California Public Employees’ Retirement System, 
CalPERS played a significant role in the positive activities of 
institutional investors in Japan, pension fund activism is much 
attributed to it for the positive role it played in inculcating some sort 
of corporate discipline due to its high ownership presence on the 
Japanese stock market (Jacoby, 2007). Japan therefore appears as 
standing tall within Far East Asia in reference to corporate 
governance as well as attracting a positive attribution to the 
Germanic system. But Dore (2005) however, is of the opinion that 
most Japanese worker unions are now playing consultative roles 
because they have lost their communal bargaining power compared 
to the German system where the centralized union model has 
succeeded in offering unions much leverage.  
All of these therefore echo the need for more to be done to enhance 
a positive corporate culture within the Far East Asia.     
2.2.3.4 Corporate Governance in Africa 
In an egalitarian society like Africa, it will be no wonder that some 
forms of traditional corporate governance might have been 
practiced in the pre-colonial and post-colonial eras. Elements of it, 
is what is found in the lead role South Africa is playing as a 
torchbearer of corporate governance-embedding the stakeholder 
approach (Rossouw et al., 2002), as well as pioneering integrated 
reporting 2  globally-where companies are meant to report their 
financial, social, environment and ethical issues in a single report 
known as the integrated report (Solomon and Maroun, 2012).  This 
stage of corporate reporting however was not achieved on a silver-
platter. During the apartheid regime; South Africa was completely 
cut out of the world economic map due to the highly turbulent 
nature characterizing the era, the country experienced economic 
sanctions which invariably affected economic growth rates (Vaughn 
and Ryan, 2006). Economic progress however, began to sprout 
after the collapse of apartheid in 1994 (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; 
Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2001; Lund-Thomsen, 2005). By 
becoming the bellwether of corporate governance in Africa (Vaughn 
and Ryan, 2006),  the passage of very important regulations like 
the South African Insider Trading Act (1998) which aided the 
Financial Services Board (FSB) in asserting its legal authority over 
recalcitrant firms (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006); the 2004 Socially 
responsible investment (SRI) Index  for the promotion of 
                                                        
2 South Africa is by far the first country in compliance with the King report III (2009) to have 
introduce integrated reporting on a national scale, where companies listed on the Johannesburg 
stock exchange with effect from the year 2010 are expected to produce a single integrated annual 
report encapsulating financial, social, Environmental and Ethical reporting which hitherto use be 
produced in two separate reports known as the annual financial report and the sustainability 
report (Solomon and Maroun, 2012).   
responsible corporate citizenship (Rossouw, 2005); the Mines 
Health and Safety Act of 1996 in a bid to improving the grim safety 
standards within the South African mining industry (Hamann, 
2004); as well as the King Report I (1994); II (2002) were in 
motion, which finally culminated in the King Report III (2009). But 
as Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse (2001) relates, effective 
governance is premised on principles such as morality, legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability which they view as onerous for a 
developing economy like South Africa to achieve, an indication of 
more to be done within the corporate governance arena in Africa. 
 
This not withstanding, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe have after the advent of colonial rule and before the 
Cadbury eon offered an indication of a growing concern for 
Corporate Governance. Yakasai (2001), expounds this, in reference 
to the Enterprises Promotion Acts 1972, 1977 and the Company and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1991, both of which were born out of the 
quest of promoting and governing businesses and their 
shareholders in the then nascent Nigerian oil and gas industry which 
predates the Cadbury Report of the UK. He however bemoaned the 
infectiveness of the CAMA 1991 with respect to Private Limited 
Liability Companies and Public Limited Liability Companies (Plcs) in 
Nigeria as follows: 
 
“Whereas the former is known for its simplicity and effective 
management, facilitating the provision of capital, encouraging 
business growth, inducing innovation in industry/commerce 
and creating wealth, the latter which is the vogue in business 
circles and global markets is fraught with lethargy, 
nonchalance and lack of personal touch due to the legal 
separation of ownership from management. In spite of this 
legal complexity, it is often the case even in Nigeria that 
ownership is the basis of power exercised through the annual 
general meetings of plc companies, an occasion where the 
shareholders wine and dine, nominate and elect their 
directors who, in the conventional wisdom and legal fiction 
provided by Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA)… 
reciprocate through accountability as mirrored in their regular 
reports and audited financial statements”. (P. 241) 
 
Rossouw (2005), makes clear the assertion of (Yakasai, 2001) in a 
survey of corporate governance developmental trends across the 
African continent which reveals Nigeria as the only country without 
an inclusive standard of corporate governance with an embrace of a 
broad spectrum of stakeholders. Within the Ugandan context 
(Wanyama et al., 2009) calls for a sound corporate governance 
regime within an elaborative framework as the sheer advent of 
governances codes are insufficient in the creation of a healthy 
corporate environment.  
 
In a published report on corporate governance practices in Ghana 
by the Ghana Institute 0f Management and Public Administration 
(GIMPA), out of a 100 companies surveyed based on turnover 
reports, 7 had their non-executive directors out-numbering their 
executive members; 19 had boards of 5 or less and 37 possessing 
boards in the range of 11 to 15 members giving an indication of no 
stark difference from the norm (Gilham, 2004). The report further 
indicates accountability as a concern, which reflected 46 out of 61 
as not having a manual for their boards; 49 indicating their 
accountability to shareholders; 5 indicating their accountability to 
the government and 1 private firm indicating accountability to their 
CEO, the most revealing of all in this survey is the citing of The 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), the state 
pension body and the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
(GNPC) also a state enterprise in their lax to producing annual 
reports as well as a perpetual habit of over borrowing (Gilham, 
2004).  
 
Inferring from the discussions on corporate governance in Africa, it 
is apparent that, corporate governance structures in Africa are 
drawn from colonial and the Bretton Woods institutions’ (World 
Bank and IMF) policies i.e., Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 
which had had an economic relationship in the past and still 
continues to (Yakasai, 2001; Okpara and Kabongo, 2010; Wanyama 
et al., 2009; Gilham, 2004). As these existing framework of 
corporate governance within the current African rubric hasn’t been 
able to live up to expectation by proffering accountability, 
transparency, and an all compassing stakeholder inclusiveness but 
rather appears to be riddled with institutional weakness and 
pervasive corruption, there is the urgent need to incorporate socio-
political and cultural elements in the design, construction and 
implementation of corporate governance frameworks within Africa 
(Wanyama et al., 2009; Judge, 2009; Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Okike, 2007). 
 
3.0 The King Report III and its Effectiveness on Institutional 
Investors in ESG 
As have been enumerated in this paper, the King Report III is by far 
the only international Corporate Governance code that confidently 
exudes stakeholder inclusivity, hence, recognizing institutional 
investors as a potent ‘cadre core’ to pushing forward issues of 
Environment, Social and Governance (ESG). It champions this in 
explicit terms as: “[An] ‘apply or explain’ market-based code of 
good practice in the context of listed companies, such as King III, is 
stronger if its implementation is overseen by those with a vested 
interest in the market working, i.e. the institutional investors. 
Recent experience indicates that the market failures in relation to 
governance are, at least in part, due to an absence of active 
institutional investors”(King Report, 2009 ,p.9). It goes further to 
back this claim in that “ these institutions are ‘trustees’ for the 
ultimate beneficiaries, who are individuals…[where] the ultimate 
beneficiaries of pension funds, which are currently among the 
largest holders of equity in South Africa, are individuals who have 
become the new owners of capital…[hence] a departure from the 
share capital being held by a few wealthy families, which was the 
norm until the end of the first half of the 20th century”(King Report, 
2009 ,p.8). This is in consonance with recent studies that firmly 
point to the fact that firms prioritize their stakeholders in 
hierarchical order with the quality of products and service coming 
first and the trust and confidence of stakeholders coming 
second(King Report, 2009). All of these among others such as 
people, planet and price as well as the three independent sub-
systems of the natural environmental, social and political system 
and the global economy make strong the case for institutional 
investors and other stakeholders to be of a firm’s priority hence 
actively driving ESG. Owing to the fact that environment, 
sustainability, people and profit are inextricably linked, the King 
Report (2009 ,p.12), advocates that “by issuing an integrated 
report internally, a company evaluates its ethics, fundamental 
values, and governance, and externally improves the trust and 
confidence of stakeholders”.  
 
Also, “the market capitalization of any company if listed on the JSE 
equals it’s economic values and not its book values…[whereas] the 
financial statement of a company, as seen in it’s balance sheet and 
profit and loss statement, is a photograph of a moment in time of 
its financial position…[hence] the king report’s [recommendation for 
integrating] sustainability performance and integrated reporting to 
enable stakeholders…make a more informed assessment of the 
economic value of a company”(King Report, 2009, p.12). An 
“integrated report should therefore have sufficient information to 
record how the company has both negatively and positively 
impacted on the economic life of the community in which it 
operated during the year under review, often categorized as 
environmental, social and governance issues (ESG) [and] 
further…report how the board believes that in the coming year it 
can improve the positive aspects and eradicate or ameliorate the 
negative aspects, in the coming year” (King Report, 2009, p.12).  
This modest ethos of the King Report III if followed in spirit and 
letter as well as perused rigorously by both regulators and industry 
would undoubtedly equip institutional investors and stakeholders 
alike in achieving the integration of ESG as a fulcrum of ‘the firm’.             
 
4.0 Conclusion 
Following the recent financial crisis of 2008 and the current debate 
on climate change and environmental sustainability, there have 
been urgent and compelling calls for firms to integrate within their 
operations key and relevant stakeholders as by way of 
communicating their various activities that have potential impacts 
as well as tangible impacts on their said stakeholders. This is all 
called for and backed in the spirit of exercising accountability and 
transparency, hence good corporate governance.  
 
Despite the rife in the current ‘Shareholder-Stakeholder’ debate, a 
significant shift in the definition of corporate governance where the 
stakeholder strand has be illuminated points to the crescendo pace 
as to how stakeholder concerns are becoming an integral aspects of 
corporate governance. Within the existing literature on corporate 
governance, though there is the reflection of a the shareholder 
value as against the stakeholder value, there is as well a dip in the 
growth of the shareholder value with a rapid move towards 
stakeholder through institutional investors. 
 
Geographical differences as well as international contacts played 
and still continue to play a vital role in shaping the diverse systems 
of corporate governance across the globe. It is most apparent that 
on the regional segmented clusters of corporate governance as 
enumerated above, traditional indigenous cultures, colonialism and 
the emerging economies’ long economic relation with the Bretton 
Woods institutions presented the architectural framework from 
which corporate governance evolved within these economies. This 
not withstanding, the King Report I following the Cadbury has since 
its inception whigged into a zenith of stakeholder inclusion in its 
latest version-the King Report III. This international corporate 
governance code has by far demonstrated a commitment to 
elevating holistic governance and stakeholder inclusion while 
offering institutional investors the muscle to act in responsible 
directions towards Social, Environmental and governance (ESG) 
issues in corporate governance. This call is laconically put forward 
by the King Report III: “[An] ‘apply or explain’ market-based code 
of good practice in the context of listed companies, such as King III, 
is stronger if its implementation is overseen by those with a vested 
interest in the market working, i.e. the institutional investors. 
Recent experience indicates that the market failures in relation to 
governance are, at least in part, due to an absence of active 
institutional investors”(King Report, 2009 ,p.9).  
 
Owing to the mere absent and weakness of institutional investor in 
the Africa (The King Report III offering glimmers of hope), MENA 
and Far East Asia (with the exception of Japan-for there is evidence 
of the potent role of institutional investors with the presence of the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement Systems (CalPERS)), an 
exigent need therefore offers itself for further research with in-
depth interviews as a conduit in ascertaining the awareness and 
practice of the institutional investor community in South Africa and 
the response to the noble calls of the King Report III and their role 
in ESG.   
 
Fig 1: The Supporting and Operational ‘contours’ of King 
Report III Leading to ESG 
 
Khalid and Solomon, 2013 
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